The lan guage of rights is per va sive. As com monly used, how ever, it is also in dis crim i nate and loose, as Wes ley Hohfeld com plained long ago.
1
In a cel e brated ef fort to fore stall con fu sion, Hohfeld dis tin guished var ious senses of a right, which he reg i mented in terms of four jural equiv alences or cor re la tives. Of these, he him self re garded the equiv a lence in which rights are cor re la tive with du ties as reg i ment ing rights in the strict est sense:
if X has a right against Y that he shall stay off the for mer's land, the corre la tive (and equiv a lent) is that Y is un der a duty to ward X to stay off the place. If, as seems de sir able, we should seek a syn onym for the term right in this lim ited and proper mean ing, per haps the word claim would prove best. Now few dis pute that Hohfeld's claim at least marks a cen tral and impor tant sense of a right. 2 In deed, it is per fectly stan dard to de fine claim-rights, as they are more of ten called, on the model of Hopfield's equiv a lence:
X has a claim-right against Y that Y j if and only if Y is un der a duty to ward X to j. Press, 1919, pp. 36 and 38. 2 Some dis pute that rights have a strict est sense. See, e. g., Sum ner, L. W., The Moral Foun da tion of Rights, Ox ford, Clar en don Press, 1987, ch. 2. 3 See, e. g., Feinberg, J., So cial Phi los o phy, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1973, ch. 4 ; Waldron, J., "In tro duc tion", The o ries of Rights, Ox ford, Ox ford Uni ver sity Press, 1984, p. 8 [here af ter, TR] ; Sum ner, op. cit., foot note 2, pp. 25-27; Thomson, J., The Realm of Rights, Cam bridge, Har vard Uni ver sity Press, 1990, pp. 41-43; Kramer, M.;  Simmonds, N. and Steiner, H., A De bate Over Rights, Ox ford, Clar en don Press, 1998. So de fined, one per son's pos ses sion of a claim-right is equiv a lent to some one else's pos ses sion of a duty-a duty, more over, with the same con tent. 4 But nei ther this fact nor any thing else Hohfeld says, for that mat ter, tells us how we are to iden tify the rel e vant pair of per sons. If I have a claim-right to some land, then some one else has a duty to stay off the land. But who has this duty ex actly? Sim i larly, if I have a duty to pay my taxes, it may be asked who, if any one, holds the cor re la tive claim-right. In cer tain cases, we may think this is easy to say. As far as my claim-right to land goes, for ex am ple, we may think the bearer of the cor re la tive duty is ev ery one. But other cases will not be so easy. How, in gen eral, are we to iden tify the bearer of the duty that cor re lates with a given claim-right? Or the holder of the claim-right that cor re lates with a given duty? If a cor re la tion be tween the right-holder and the duty-bearer be longs to the na ture of claim-rights, as the stan dard def i ni tion sug gests, an ad e quate un der stand ing of claim-rights re quires an un der stand ing of the ba sis of this cor re la tion.
Ri val ac counts of the cor re la tion are of fered by two well-es tab lished theories of rights, the Will the ory and the In ter est the ory.
5 Yet neither the ory, it seems to me, is ul ti mately sat is fac tory. To be gin with, I shall pres ent each the ory, to gether with the main prob lems it faces. In my view, the best ob jec tion that each the ory wields against the other is un an swer able. More con struc tively, I shall then sug gest a hy brid of the two the o ries. I shall ar gue that it solves the main prob lems con front ing the Will and In ter est the o ries. We should there fore pre fer the hy brid theory. GOPAL SREENIVASAN 766 4 In Hopfield's ex am ple, the claim-right and the duty share the con tent that Y stay off X's land. To pre serve id iom, we could also say, al ter na tively, that they share a content that is sat is fied by Y's stay ing off X's land. 5 In pre sent ing the de bate be tween these the o ries in terms of their ac count of the cor re la tion be tween claim-right holder and duty-bearer, I fol low Waldron, op. cit., footnote 3, pp. 8 and 9, and Sum ner, op. cit., foot note 2, pp. 24 and 39-45. While there are other ways to frame the de bate, I do not think the choice of frame af fects the ar gu ment at any point. My choice is based on in de pend ent grounds, which I dis cuss in a com pan ion pa per, "Du ties and their di rec tion". I 1. Let me be gin with the Will the ory. 6 The fol low ing rough state ment will serve our pur poses: (WT) Sup pose X has a duty to j. Y has a claim-right against X that X j just in case Y has some mea sure of control over X's duty".
To ex plain what is meant by a mea sure of con trol over a duty, we should turn to H. L. A. Hart, one of the fore most pro po nents of the Will the ory. Ac cord ing to Hart, the full mea sure of con trol over X's duty com prises three pow ers:
(i) the po wer to wai ve X's duty or not;
(ii) the po wer to en for ce X's duty or not, gi ven that X has brea ched it; (iii) the po wer to wai ve X's duty to com pen sa te, which is con se quent upon his ori gi nal breach. Note that the power to en force X's duty in (ii) in cludes both the power to sue X for com pen sa tion and the power to sue for an in junc tion against X.
I think it is fair to say that our clear est par a digms of a claim-right are the claim-rights rec og nized in prop erty and con tract law. The Will theory bases it self closely on these par a digms. In deed, it holds, in ef fect, that they pres ent the nec es sary and suf fi cient con di tions for claim-right holding. It there fore stands to rea son that, in prop erty and con tracts, the du ties that cor re late with claim-rights are du ties over which the claim-holder typ i cally has the full mea sure of con trol en com passed by the pow ers (i)-(iii).
It is the sig nal advantage of (WT) that Y's hav ing the full mea sure of con trol over X's duty to j gives a readily com pre hen si ble sense to the state ment that X's duty is owed to Y, and so to the state ment that it is Y who holds the cor re la tive claim-right against X. Lesser mea sures of control can be ac com mo dated as ap prox i ma tions to the case of full con trol.
Thus, as Hart says, du ties with cor re la tive rights are a spe cies of nor mative prop erty be long ing to the right holder, and this fig ure be comes in telli gi ble by ref er ence to the spe cial form of con trol over a cor re la tive duty which a per son with such a right is given by the law. 8 But (WT) con fronts two se ri ous ob jec tions. One con cerns in alien able rights.
9 Some times a claim-right holder is dis abled from waiv ing the duties that cor re late with his claim-right. Typ i cally this is done for the right-holder's own good and pro tec tion. More over, as Neil MacCormick ob serves, the pro tec tive dis abil ity is typ i cally also seen as strength en ing the claim-right. A dra matic ex am ple is the claim-right not to be en slaved. Less dra matic ex am ples in clude the claim-right not to be op er ated upon with out in formed con sent; 10 and the claim-right not to be em ployed in unsafe work ing con di tions. (In some ways, the less dra matic ex am ples are ac tu ally more im por tant, since they ex hibit the fact that in alien able claim-rights need not be cor re lated with ex tremely weighty du ties. Hence, the strength added by a pro tec tive dis abil ity is dis tinct from the weight, in that sense, of the orig i nal claim-right).
11 In any case, we likely do not wish to deny ei ther that Y has a claim-right against X that X not en slave Y or that Y has a claim-right against X that X not em ploy Y in un safe work ing con di tions. It is worth em pha siz ing that the cru cial ques tion here con cerns the pos si bil ity, rather than the fact, of in alien able claim-rights (WT) makes in alien able claim-rights in co her ent in prin ci ple.
A sec ond crit i cism con cerns in com pe tent adults. 12 Say Y is in com petent to ex er cise any of -and there fore lacks, in the rel e vant sense-the Press, 1977, pp. 195-199. 10 The in alien able claim-right here, to be pre cise, is the claim-right to re ceive a standard dis clo sure prior to con sent ing (to an op er a tion or other med i cal treat ment). In U. S. law, this claim-right may not be in alien able, since it seems that a phy si cian's duty to disclose can ac tu ally be waived. See Berg, J. W.; Appelbaum, P. S.; Lidz, C. W and Parker, L. S., In formed Con sent: Le gal The ory and Clin i cal Prac tice, 2nd. ed., New York, Oxford Uni ver sity Press, 2001, ch. 4 . But given the stan dard anal y sis of the re quire ments of in formed con sent -on which they in clude un der stand ing the stan dard dis clo sure-a patient's hav ing the power to waive the phy si cian's duty to dis close is in co her ent. On the stan dard anal y sis, there fore, the claim-right is in alien able. 11 The sec ond of the less dra matic ex am ples also makes it clear that what the pro tective dis abil ity pro tects need not be the au ton omy, spe cif i cally, of the claim-right holder.
12 A better known vari ant of this ob jec tion con cerns chil dren. But I think this vari ant is li a ble, with rea son, to greater con tro versy. pow ers (i)-(iii) be cause, for ex am ple, Y is in a coma. Do we wish to say that Y no lon ger has a claim-right against X that X not as sault Y or steal from Y? Or that X no lon ger owes Y du ties not to as sault or steal from Y? Pre sum ably not. But (WT) im plies that some one with no mea sure of con trol over a duty lacks the cor re la tive claim-right.
In the par a digm cases of a claim-right, the in ter ests of the right-holder are ad vanced, on bal ance, by the fact that he or she is em pow ered to waive the cor re la tive duty. One way to re gard these ob jec tions is this: they pres ent cases in which the in ter ests of the per son in ques tion are not ad vanced, on bal ance, by be ing so em pow ered. In deed, they pres ent cases in which the per son's in ter ests are ad vanced, on bal ance, ei ther by not hav ing the power to waive the rel e vant duty (first ob jec tion) or by some one else's hav ing that power (sec ond ob jec tion). Yet it seems intu itive to re gard the per son dis abled from waiv ing the rel e vant du ties as still hold ing the cor re la tive claim-right.
The fun da men tal dif fi culty with (WT), then, is that it pre vents us from gen er al iz ing the no tion of a claim-right from the par a digm cases to cases of in alien abil ity and in com pe tence, cases to which we clearly should be able to gen er al ize it. It seems to me that this dif fi culty can not be over come.
2. By way of il lus tra tion, let us con sider Nigel Simmonds re cent response to the in alien abil ity ob jec tion. 13 Simmonds dis cusses par tial and com plete in alien abil ity sep a rately. In the par tial case, the agent lacks (i) the power to waive a duty, but re tains (ii) the power to sue for en forcement and (iii) the power to waive com pen sa tion. In the com plete case, the agent has no con trol over the duty what ever. Here Simmonds' discus sion con cerns crim i nal law pro hi bi tions against mur der and as sault.
Simmonds ar gues that the Will the ory does, in fact, vest agents in the par tial case with a cor re la tive claim-right, since they re tain a re sid ual mea sure of con trol over the duty, of pre cisely the kind Hart de scribes. Fur ther more, he de nies that this re duc tion from the full mea sure of control is in con sis tent with strength en ing the claim-right, on the ground that it is over-sim ple to iden tify the strength of some one's claim-right with the mea sure of her con trol over the cor re la tive duty. To han dle the case of com plete in alien abil ity, Simmonds in vokes the dis tinc tion be tween legal rights and moral rights. On the le gal side, he is con tent to af firm (WT)'s im pli ca tion that the crim i nal law con fers no claim-right against mur der or as sault. On the moral side, he is con tent to in sist that the duties not to mur der and not to as sault re ally can be waived.
Nei ther of these re plies with stands scru tiny. It is true that (WT) vests agents who have even a re sid ual mea sure of con trol over a duty with a cor re la tive claim-right. But it can not se ri ously be main tained that re ducing the right-holder's mea sure of con trol is con sis tent with strength en ing her claim-right, at least not on the Will the ory's con cep tion of a claim-right. Some one with only a re sid ual mea sure of con trol over my duty to j lacks the abil ity to ex ert her will in cer tain ways no ta bly, to make it the case that my fail ure to j does not count as a breach of my duty. How can this not weaken her abil ity to ex ert her will, and so not weaken her claim-right on (WT)?
Simmonds' sec ond re ply is be side the point. In ei ther law or mor als, one might de bate whether or not a cer tain claim-right is com pletely inalien able. Let the ex am ple be one's fa vor ite. For pres ent pur poses, it is sim ply ir rel e vant to in sist that one po si tion or the other in the re sul tant de bate is cor rect. The ques tion is whether the de bate it self is co her ent; and the very fact that Simmonds can en gage in the de bate shows that it is. But this con tra dicts (WT), which ex cludes the co her ence of as sert ing that any claim-right is com pletely in alien able. II 1. Let me now in tro duce the In ter est the ory. The fol low ing rough state ment will serve our pur poses to be gin with: "(IT) Sup pose X has a duty to j. Y has a claim-right against X that X j just in case Y stands in a sanc tioned re la tion to ben e fit ing from X's j-ing".
This for mu la tion is slightly odd. But it al lows (IT) to cover a num ber of sub tle vari a tions in the ba sic struc ture of the In ter est the ory. For now, we can think of stand ing to ben e fit from X's j-ing' and be ing in tended to ben e fit from X's j-ing' as the sanc tioned re la tions. (IT) also gives a com pre hen si ble sense to the state ment that X's duty is owed to Y, and so to the state ment that it is Y who holds the cor re la tive claim-right against X: namely, the duty is for Y's ben e fit.
(IT) is more gen eral than (WT) in two im por tant re spects. First, it extends the no tion of a claim-right to a wider range of cases than (WT) does. In par tic u lar, (IT) ex tends the no tion to the cases of in alien abil ity and in com pe tence that mo ti vated the ob jec tions to (WT). On the plau sible as sump tion that X's en slav ing Y or em ploy ing Y in un safe work ing con di tions or as sault ing a co ma tose Y sets Y's in ter ests back, (IT) yields the ver dict that X's du ties not to per form any of these ac tions are still owed to Y, and so that Y still holds the cor re la tive claim-right.
Second, (IT) is as so ci ated with a more gen eral ac count of the jus ti fi cation of claim-rights. On the ac count as so ci ated with (WT), the jus ti fi ca tion for em pow er ing Y to waive the duty cor re la tive to her claim-right, and so for vest ing her with the claim-right, lies in the fact that so do ing serves Y's in ter est in au ton o mous choice.
14 In the par a digm cases, empow er ing Y to waive this duty also ad vances her in ter ests on bal ance. By con trast, on the ac count as so ci ated with (IT), the jus ti fi ca tion for the struc ture of Y's nor ma tive stand ing, as we might put it, lies in the more gen eral fact of what ad vances Y's in ter ests on bal ance. It is not tied to the more spe cific fact of what ad vances Y's in ter est in au ton o mous choice.
15 When these facts co in cide, as they do in the par a digm cases, (IT) yields the same re sults as (WT).
16 But when they di verge, as they do in the cases mo ti vat ing the ob jec tions (IT) clas si fies du ties that ad vance Y's in ter ests as owed to Y, even if Y has no mea sure of con trol over them, as long as Y's dis abil ity with re spect to these du ties ad vances her in ter ests on bal ance.
At least one se ri ous ob jec tion can be raised against (IT). This concerns the prob lem of third party ben e fi cia ries. 17 In sim ple form, the prob lem is as fol lows. Sup pose you prom ise your brother to pay your sis ter $100. Or di narily, we would say that your brother now has a claim-right against you or that you now owe a duty to your brother to pay your sis ter $100. Hart ques tions whether (IT) yields this ver dict.
18
How ever that may be, (IT) cer tainly yields the ver dict that your duty to pay your sis ter is (also) owed to your sis ter, and so that your sis ter (also) has a claim-right against you, since she ben e fits from the $100. Hart also main tains that this ver dict is in cor rect. 19 How ever that may be, it would cer tainly be the wrong ver dict if your duty to pay your sister were also owed to your sis ter's child, on whom -let us say-she will spend the $100, so that her child had a claim-right against you. But (IT) clearly ap pears to yield that ver dict as well.
More gen er ally, the ob jec tion is that, in tu itively, there is a limit to the num ber of peo ple to whom du ties are owed, and so to the num ber of claim-rights that arise, un der a third party prom ise or con tract. Indeed, for many du ties, there is an in tu itive limit to the num ber of people to whom the duty is owed. It is there fore a con di tion of ad e quacy on (IT) that its gen er al iza tion of the no tion of a claim-right suit ably limit the num ber of peo ple it clas si fies as cor re la tive claim-hold ers. For the most part, how ever, this con di tion of ad e quacy has not been met.
20
GOPAL SREENIVASAN 772 17 See, no ta bly, Hart, H. L. A., "Are there Any Nat u ral Rights?" [1955] in Waldron, op. cit., foot note 3, pp. 81 and 82; and Hart, op. cit., foot note 7, pp. 187 and 188.
18 See pre vi ous note. Some in ter est the o rists re ply by af firm ing that your brother has an in ter est in your ful fill ing your prom ise to him, in which case (IT) will vest him with a claim-right against you. See, e. g., Ly ons, D., "Rights, Claim ants, and Ben e fi cia ries" [1969] 20 MacCormick re plies that the third party ob jec tion can also be re-mod elled to tell against the Will the ory, and thus proves too much (op. cit., foot note 8, pp. 208 and 209). As it hap pens, his re-mod el ling is not ef fec tive. But even if it were, it would still not show that (IT) had it self sat is fied the con di tion of ad e quacy.
2. By way of il lus tra tion, let us con sider a prom is ing de fense of the In terest the ory re cently of fered by Mat thew Kramer. 21 To his credit, Kramer con fronts the cen tral prob lem head on, ex plic itly ac knowl edg ing that we have to dis tin guish the rel e vant ben e fi ciary from other peo ple whose well-be ing may be ad vanced by the ex e cu tion of the con tract... [Must the In ter est the ory] as cribe a right to any one who might ben e fit from the carry ing out of the con tract? If the an swer here were yes, then the In ter est The ory would merit no fur ther con sid er ation as a se ri ous the ory of rights.
The the ory Kramer de fends is some what dif fer ent from (IT). In par ticu lar, it of fers dif fer ent suf fi cient con di tions for hold ing a claim-right. Kramer adapts his pre ferred suf fi cient con di tions from Bentham's test for the as sign ment of rights un der a law, as glossed by Hart.
22 Ac cord ing to Hart, Bentham's test iden ti fies hold ers of a claim-right cor re la tive to a given duty by ask ing what find ings are nec es sary to es tab lish a breach of that duty by the duty-bearer. In par tic u lar, it asks whether det ri ment to the can di date right-holder is nec es sary to es tab lish a breach. Kramer adapts the test by sub sti tut ing suf fi cient for nec es sary.
23
Thus, on Kramer's test, if det ri ment to X is suf fi cient to es tab lish a breach by the duty-bearer, then X holds a cor re la tive claim-right and other wise not. 24 In terms of our ex am ple, we are to ask what find ings are suf fi cient to es tab lish that you have breached your duty to pay your sister $100. Since proof that your sis ter suf fered the det ri ment of not having been paid $100 by you suf fices to es tab lish that you breached this duty, it fol lows on Kramer's test that she holds a claim-right cor re la tive to your duty. By con trast, proof that her child suf fered the det ri ment of not hav ing been given a $100 pres ent does not suf fice to es tab lish a breach of your duty. Hence, the child does not hold a cor re la tive claim-right. So Kramer's test cer tainly rules some ben e fi cia ries out as claim-right hold ers; and may even seem to draw the line in the right place.
Ap pear ances, how ever, can be de ceiv ing. To be gin with, we should ask how, on Kramer's test, your brother -the promisee-qual i fies as a claim-right holder. Pre sum ably, it is be cause of his in ter est in see ing his wishes ful filled. 25 The idea is that proof of your brother's det ri ment of not see ing his sis ter get her $100 will suf fice to es tab lish a breach of your duty. But it is not clear that this will do the trick. Imag ine that your grand mother has an in ter est in see ing her grand chil dren be have themselves, get ben e fits, and so on. Will proof of the det ri ment to her-of not see ing her grand daugh ter get her $100-suf fice to es tab lish a breach of your duty? If so, your grand mother will also hold a cor re la tive claim-right.
An ad e quate test of claim-right hold ing should draw the line be tween your grand mother and your brother. Yet it is not clear how Kramer's test can ex clude the for mer with out also ex clud ing the lat ter. I can make out three op tions, none of them sat is fac tory. First, your grand mother may be ex cluded because she is not a party to the prom ise. But this fails to distinguish her from your sis ter, who is said to hold a cor re la tive claim-right. Sec ond, your grand mother may be ex cluded be cause her interest is par a sitic-it smug gles in ref er ence to your sis ter's det ri ment. But this fails to dis tin guish her from your brother, who would oth er wise fail to hold a cor re la tive claim-right. 26 Third, your grand mother may be ex cluded be cause her in ter est is not im por tant enough. But the one clear way of in ter pret ing this op tion is not avail able to Kramer. One might require the det ri ment to be so im por tant that proof of it is nec es sary to establish a breach of the rel e vant duty. How ever, this would be to adopt pre cisely the struc ture of Hart's gloss on Bentham's test, which Kramer ex plic itly re jects.
Fur ther more, if we ex am ine the no tion of what suf fices to es tab lish a breach a lit tle more closely, a dif fer ent sort of trou ble soon emerges. Con sider the spe cial case where your brother waives your duty to pay your sis ter. 27 In this case, your sis ter's det ri ment is not suf fi cient to establish'a breach of your duty. Hav ing once seen this, we should then rec og nize that her det ri ment does not suf fice even when your brother GOPAL SREENIVASAN 774 25 Cfr. op. cit., foot note 3, pp. 79 and 80 26 Changes in the de scrip tion of your brother's in ter est can be mir rored by changes in your grand mother's in ter est. In prin ci ple, the de scrip tion of his in ter est should not explic itly re fer to the breach or ful fill ment of your prom ise, since this would make Kramer's test vac u ous (cfr. note 23). For that mat ter, how ever, your grand mother may also have an in ter est in prom ises to her grand chil dren be ing kept. 27 This case is also dis cussed by Hillel Steiner, who makes some what dif fer ent use of it. Steiner, H., "Work ing Rights", in Kramer et al., op. cit., foot note 3, pp. 285 and 286. does not waive your duty, since he might have done. 28 In fact, even your brother's par a sitic det ri ment does not re ally suf fice to es tab lish your breach, since det ri ment on his part does not, strictly speak ing, en tail that he did not waive your duty. Kramer's test there fore fails to vest the one un con tro ver sial claim-right holder -the promisee-with a claim-right against you. 29 
III
One ver sion of the In ter est the ory is plau si bly re garded as ex empt from the third party ben e fi ciary ob jec tion. I think Jo seph Raz's ver sion may be seen as hav ing solved the prob lem, which is some what ironic, since as far as I know he does not dis cuss it. 30 Still, let me briefly adapt his def i ni tion of rights to this end: 31 (RZ) Y has a claim-right against X that X j just in case, other things be ing equal, an as pect of Y's well-be ing (his in ter est) is a suf fi cient rea son for hold ing X un der a duty to j.
The thresh old re quire ment that Y's in ter est must it self suf fice, other things equal, to jus tify X's duty may be re garded as for mi da ble enough to set a suit able limit on the num ber hold ing a claim-right cor re la tive to X's duty to j. Is your nephew's or niece's in ter est in the $100, for ex ample, it self suf fi cient to ground a duty on your part, other things equal, to pay your sis ter? Prob a bly not.
So far, so good. How ever, Raz's ac count faces an other prob lem, as he him self con cedes. 32 I be lieve Raz's so lu tion to this other prob lem is objec tion able. More over, it is ar gu able that he is forced into the ob jec tion -A HYBRID THEORY OF CLAIM-RIGTHS 775 28 Kramer later men tions, but does not re solve, a re lated is sue about when a given proof is suf fi cient (op. cit., foot note 3, pp. 90 and 91).
29 Kramer does some times slip in the qual i fi ca tion unexcused det ri ment´ (e. g., op. cit., pp. 82 and 83), which might be ex ploited to cover cases where the duty is waived. But this makes his test vac u ous. Com pare the equiv a lent no tion of a det ri ment in breach, which ex plic itly drains the test of con tent. Press, 1994, p. 45 (cfr. Raz, op. cit., foot note 24, p. 187) . My dis cus sion in the re main der of this sec tion re fers to this ar ti cle. able as pect of that so lu tion by the struc ture of his so lu tion to the third party ben e fi ciary prob lem. Thus, while (RZ) avoids the ob jec tion against (IT), the price it ul ti mately pays for its so lu tion is un ac cept ably high.
The prob lem Raz ad mits he faces is that of ex plain ing the ap par ent mis match be tween the weight of many rights and the weight of the right-holder's cor re spond ing in ter est. The weight of the claim-right -that is, the weight of its cor re la tive du ties-is of ten, so it seems, much greater than the weight of the right-holder's in ter est. Con sider, for ex am ple, a jour nal ist's claim-right to with hold the names of her sources. 33 We may sup pose that the du ties that cor re late with this claim-rightCdu ties that pro tect the free dom of the pressChave great weight. By con trast, the in ter est an in di vid ual jour nal ist has in pro tect ing her sources is of ten, if not al ways, com par a tively slight. But it is un clear how this can be, given that on (RZ) the jour nal ist's in ter est is meant to be suf fi cient to jus tify the cor re la tive duty (not to re quire jour nal ists to dis close their sources).
Raz's so lu tion may be de scribed, in a nut shell, as a piggy-back ing solu tion: He al lows that, some times, the im por tance of an in di vid ual's inter est can, for the pur poses of as sess ing its con tri bu tion to the jus ti fi cation of some one else's duty, be aug mented by tak ing the in ter ests of third par ties into ac count. Spe cif i cally, it can be thus aug mented just in case the in ter ests of the third par ties are served pre cisely by serv ing the rel e vant in ter est of the in di vid ual in ques tion. That is, the im por tance of the in di vid ual's in ter est can be aug mented just in case the third par ties' in ter ests can piggy-back on it; and then its im por tance is aug mented by cred it ing it with the weight of the piggy on its back.
Ap plied to the case of the jour nal ist, Razes so lu tion is to al low the gen eral pub lic's in ter est in a free press -in clud ing its in ter est in liv ing in the kind of so ci ety made pos si ble by free dom of the press-to weigh in fa vour of the jour nal ist's claim-right; and to do so just be cause the public's in ter est is served pre cisely by se cur ing the jour nal ist's own in ter est in pro tect ing her sources. More gen er ally, Raz ar gues, the great weight of many fun da men tal civil and po lit i cal rights is to be ex plained by the fact that the dis tinc tive com mon goods of a lib eral cul ture are rid ing piggy-back on the in di vid ual in ter ests that cor re spond to these rights.
My ob jec tion to this so lu tion is that it instrumentalizes the in di vidual's sta tus as right-holder. 34 By us ing the in di vid ual to en able oth ers to grace their cause with the ban ner of right-hold ing, Raz's so lu tion fails to take the sta tus of right-holder se ri ously enough. As sign ments of this sta tusCthat is, the vest ing of an in di vid ual with a given claim-rightCshould re flect noth ing apart from the in trin sic stand ing of the in di vid ual who is to pos sess it. 35 Con se quently, if claim-rights are vested on the ba sis of the weight of an in di vid ual's in ter est, as they are on (RZ), then the in divid ual's in ter est has, for these pur poses, to be weighed sim ply on its own. In the case of the jour nal ist, that is to say: if her claim-right to protect her sources is to pre vail in the so cial cal cu lus, and pre vail on account of the jour nal ist's sta tus as a right-holder, that must be be cause the jour nal ist's own in ter est has suf fi cient weight to de feat the in ter ests others have in learn ing the iden tity of her sources.
36 If the jour nal ist's in terest lacks this weight, then ei ther she has to re veal her sources or, more plau si bly, free dom of the press will have to be re garded as (at least, largely) a mat ter of net so cial util ity, rather than as a mat ter of in di vidual rights.
No tice that in sist ing that the sta tus of right-holder re flect only the intrin sic stand ing of the rel e vant in di vid ual 35 At a min i mum, this re quire ment is a de sid er a tum for a the ory of claim-rights, one that de rives from the aim of pre serv ing the con nec tion be tween the lan guage of rights and lib eral in di vid u al ism. In its weak est ver sion, my ar gu ment against (RZ) is that it fails this de sid er a tum, whereas (as we shall see) my hy brid al ter na tive sat is fies it. I ac tu ally be lieve, more strongly, that the re quire ment stated in the text is a con di tion of ad e quacy on a the ory of claim-rights. But I shall not ar gue for this here. 36 The in ter est of the jour nal ist that must have suf fi cient weight here is her in ter est as an in di vid ual per son (al beit, one who is a jour nal ist). As an anon y mous ref eree has observed, the in di vid ual jour nal ist might also be thought to have in ter ests as the oc cu pant of a cer tain of fice (i. e., that of jour nal ist), in ter ests that are in de pend ent of her in ter ests as a per son and that re flect -by def i ni tion (of the of fice), rather than by in stru men tal align ment-the in ter ests third par ties have in a free press. We need not de cide whether this al ter na tive anal y sis pro vides a better ac count of the free dom of the press. Even if it does, the ac count it pro vides ei ther makes no ap peal to the jour nal ist's sta tus as a right-holder (as dis tinct from her sta tus as an of fice-holder) or else it, too, makes as signments of that sta tus re flect some thing in ad di tion to the jour nal ist's in trin sic stand ing as an in di vid ual. In the first (more likely) case, the ac count on of fer is not enough like Raz's ac count to help him; and, in the sec ond case, too much like it to sat isfy our de sider a tum. sig nif i cance that stand ing ac tu ally has. In par tic u lar, it re mains open whether an in di vid ual's own in ter est (al ways) has suf fi cient weight to pre vail against the on slaught of the so cial cal cu lus. Per haps no in di vidual's in ter est can be worth that much. I do not knowCthat is an other mat ter. But if it is not worth that much, we should not pre tend that in divid ual claim-rights have as much weight as we or di narily sup pose they do. 37 More over, a the ory of rights should not vin di cate that pre tence on the un der side of a piggy.
(RZ) avoids the ob jec tion con found ing (IT) be cause of its re quire ment that Y's in ter est suf fice, other things equal, to jus tify X's duty in or der for Y to hold the cor re la tive claim-right. How ever, given the mis match between the great weight or di narily at tached to the du ties that cor re late with cer tain claim-rights and the lim ited weight that can be jus ti fi ably ac corded to any one in di vid ual's in ter ests, an ac count with (RZ)'s structure faces a di lemma. Ei ther Y's in ter est is weighed strictly on its own or it is not. If it is, then X's duty must it self have lim ited weight, which con tra dicts our or di nary as sump tion in cer tain im por tant cases. If it is not, then the cor re la tion of X's duty with Y's claim-right is due to an instru men tal -al beit non-for tu itous-align ment be tween an in di vid ual's in ter ests and those of cer tain third par ties. Raz ap pears to em brace the second horn of this di lemma. But nei ther strikes me as very com fortable. IV It seems to me, then, that we lack a sat is fac tory so lu tion to the de bate be tween the Will the ory and the In ter est the ory. We there fore lack a satis fac tory un der stand ing of the cor re la tion be tween the right-holder and the duty-bearer that is con sti tu tive of claim-rights. I should like to propose a new un der stand ing. The ac count I pro pose is a hy brid of the Will the ory and the In ter est the ory. I shall first pres ent a rather crude hy brid, which is nev er the less ad e quate to meet the ob jec tions faced by (WT) and (IT). Then I shall re fine my pro posal, and ex plain how it avoids the objec tion I made to (RZ).
1. Con sider a Sim ple Hy brid model of claim-rights.
GOPAL SREENIVASAN 778 37 Ei ther that or we should re ject (RZ) we should deny, that is, that claim-rights are vested on the ba sis of the suf fi ciency of an in di vid ual's in ter est to jus tify the cor re la tive duty. But this op tion is not open to Raz.
(SH) Sup pose X has a duty to j. Y has a claim-right against X that X j just in case:
eit her Y has the po wer to wai ve X's duty to j or Y has no po wer to wai ve X's duty to j,but (that is be cau se) Y's di sa bi lity ad van ces Y's in te rests on ba lan ce.
This model has var i ous ad van tages over (WT). First, (SH) can han dle clas si cal in alien able rights, for ex am ple, a claim-right not to be en slaved or a claim-right not to be sub ject to un safe work ing con di tions. In these cases, Y's dis abil ity is im posed to se cure Y's own po si tion on balance and is standardly taken to strengthen Y's claim-right. Sec ond, (SH) can han dle var i ous forms of in com pe tence to waive a duty with out having to dis solve the cor re la tive claim-right. Here, again, the dis abil ity to waive the rel e vant du ties se cures the per son's own po si tion on bal ance. In both cases, Y qual i fies as a claim-right holder un der the sec ond disjunct.
The Sim ple Hy brid model also has an im por tant ad van tage over (IT). (SH)'s ad van tage is that it solves the in fa mous third party ben e fi ciary prob lem. Say that B prom ises A to do some thing that ex plic itly fa vours C and im plic itly fa vours D (whom C will fa vour, as it hap pens, if B performs). On (SH), A qual i fies as a claim-right holder un der the first disjunct, since we may as sume that A has the power to waive B's duty. D does not qual ify as a claim-right holder since he fails both disjuncts. Or di narily, the same holds of C.
It is nat u ral to see the merit of the In ter est the ory as be ing that it is more gen eral than the Will the ory. At the same time, how ever, it is possi ble to see its de merit as be ing pre cisely that it over-gen er al izes from the Will the ory. The cor rect the ory clearly has to be more gen eral than the Will the ory be cause there are im por tant cases of claim-rights that the Will the ory mis han dles. One way of ap proach ing the prob lem of a theory of claim-rights, then, is to look for a way of gen er al iz ing from the Will the ory's treat ment of the par a digm cases of con trac tual and property rights that man ages not to over do it. The In ter est the ory fails at this be cause it awards too many claim-rights. I con tend that (SH) suc ceeds, by gen er al iz ing the Will the ory but only within clear lim its.
There is also a ge neric ad van tage to (SH), that is, an ad van tage with re spect to both the Will and the In ter est the o ries. (SH) gives us some inde pend ent pur chase on the ques tion of whether there are in di vid ual claim-rights un der the crim i nal law. This ques tion is standardly treated as a mat ter of bare judge ment. Those who think there ob vi ously are claim-rights un der the crim i nal law treat their judge ment as a ba sis for crit i ciz ing the Will the ory, 38 whereas those who think there plainly are not claim-rights un der the crim i nal law, at least not for the most part, treat their judge ment as a ba sis for crit i ciz ing the In ter est the ory.
39 On (SH), the an swer turns on the rea sons for vest ing con trol over crim i nal law du ties in the pub lic pros e cu tion ser vice. If the pub lic pros e cu tor has this con trol be cause that is what best se cures the in ter est of in di vid ual mem bers of the pub lic, then crim i nal law du ties do cor re late with in divid ual claim-rights. But if the jus ti fi ca tion for vest ing con trol with a pub lic pros e cu tor is, for ex am ple, to se cure con sis tency in the ad min istra tion of jus tice, then crim i nal law du ties do not cor re late with in di vidual claim-rights.
What if both jus ti fi ca tions ap ply? Then we should con sider whether a given jus ti fi ca tion would it self be suf fi cient to over turn an op po site verdict from the other. Say, for ex am ple, that in di vid u als' in ter ests in se curity are best ad vanced by vest ing in di vid u als with the power to waive crim i nal law du ties, but the ad min is tra tion of jus tice is best ad vanced by vest ing that power in the pub lic pros e cu tor in stead. In this case, which jus ti fi ca tion would pre vail? If the lat ter would pre vail, then even if in divid u als' se cu rity and the ad min is tra tion of jus tice are both ad vanced by vest ing con trol in the pros e cu tion ser vice, the lat ter jus ti fi ca tion is what set tles the ques tion. Ac cord ing to (SH), there fore, crim i nal law du ties do not cor re late with in di vid ual claim-rights, since in di vid u als are not disabled from waiv ing those du ties be cause it ad vances their in ter ests on bal ance.
No tice that, on this view, the weight of the rel e vant du ties is ir rel e vant to the ques tion of whether they cor re late with claim-rights (at least, it is not a suf fi cient con di tion). There is no in con gru ity, it seems to me, in say ing that weighty du ties that are not owed to in di vid u als do not cor relate with in di vid ual claim-rights. 2. Let us now con sider a se ries of pair-wise com par i sons be tween (SH) and var i ous com pli ca tions on it that serve to iden tify de fects in (SH) upon which we can im prove. The vari a tions from (SH) ap pear in bold face.
Vari ant A. Sup pose X is duty-bound to j. Y has a claim-right against X that X j just in case:
eit her Y has the po wer to wai ve a duty of X's to j or Y has no po wer to wai ve a duty of X's to j, but (that is be cau se) Y's di sa bi lity ad van ces Y´s in te rests on ba lan ce.
(SH) may sug gest or im ply ei ther that X can only have one duty with a given con tent -for ex am ple, to j-or that, in or der for X to owe Y a duty to j, Y must have the power to bring it about that X has no duty to j at all. By con trast, we or di narily sup pose that some one can owe du ties with iden ti cal con tent seven iden ti cal non-indexical con tents to dif fer ent peo ple. For ex am ple, I can owe both my fiancée and my mother a duty to make it to the church on time. Vari ant A makes clear that X's ow ing Y a duty to j does not ex clude X's also ow ing Z a duty to j. Like wise, Y's waiv ing X's duty to j need not bring it about that X has no duty to j. It may well be, for ex am ple, that X still owes Z a duty to j. This limit'on Y's power to waive a duty of X's to j does not pre vent Y's power from mak ing it the case that at least one of X's du ties to j is owed to Y; and so does not pre vent Y from hold ing a cor re la tive claim-right.
Vari ant B. Sup pose X has a duty to j. Y has a claim-right against X that X j just in case:
eit her Y has so me mea su re of con trol over X's duty to j or Y has no con trol over X's duty to j, but (that is be cau se) Y's di sa bility ad van ces Y's in te rests on ba lan ce.
Re call that Hart dis tin guishes three lev els of con trol in the full measure of con trol over a duty rec og nized by the Will the ory. (SH) fixes narrowly on the first level of con trol, whereas vari ant B ranges more widely. On (SHB), the pri mary non-con trac tual ben e fi ciary of a contract in my ear lier exampleCmay also qual ify as a right-holder if he or she has the power to en force the duty, even if he or she lacks the power to waive the duty it self.
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Vari ant C. Sup pose X has a duty to j. Y has a claim-right against X that X j just in case:
either Y has the power to waive X's duty to j or Z has the power to waive X's duty to j, but (that is be cause) so empow er ing Z ad vances Y's in ter ests on bal ance.
When Y is com pe tent to waive X's duty, but nev er the less dis abled from do ing so (SH) al lows Y to qual ify as a right-holder un der its sec ond disjunct as long as Y's dis abil ity se cures her own po si tion on bal ance. In these cases, Y's po si tion is se cured, on bal ance, by pre vent ing her from ex er cis ing this power to her own det ri ment. When Y is incom pe tent, there is no need to pre vent her from ex er cis ing any such power. (SH)'s sec ond disjunct is triv i ally sat is fied, and so func tions sim ply to pre serve Y's cor re la tive claim-right. But (SH) thereby ap pears to as sim i late cases of in com pe tence to those of in alien abil ity, by mak ing no pro vi sion for X's duty ever to be waived. This leaves open the case in which Y is incom pe tent to waive X's duty, but where Y's in ter ests are ad vanced on bal ance by vest ing some third party, Z, with a power to waive X's duty. (SHC) makes it ex plicit that pow ers of waiver can be ex er cised in trust and that those on whose be half they are placed in trust can still qual ify as claim-right hold ers.
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Vari ant E. Sup pose X has a duty to j. Y has a claim-right against X that X j just in case:
Y's power (or dis abil ity) to waive X's duty to j matches (by de sign) the out come (hav ing the power or not) that ad vances Y's in ter ests on bal ance. This has two ad van tages over (SH). First, it ti dies up the dis junc tive for mu la tion. The par en thet i cal ref er ence to de sign is meant to pre serve (SH)'s sen si tiv ity to the jus ti fi ca tion un der ly ing Y's po si tion. Sec ond, the one small change in con tent ef fected by the ti dy ing is ac tu ally an improve ment. On (SH), pos ses sion of the power to waive X's duty to j suf fices to qual ify Y as a claim-right holder, re gard less of whether hav -GOPAL SREENIVASAN 782 40 Cfr. Hart, op. cit., foot note 7, p. 187. 41 We might also con sider a vari ant D: the same as (SHC), ex cept that Z is in terpreted to cover both third par ties and the null party, i. e. no one (SHD) would ex tend the ra tio nale in (SHC) to cover the case in which Y's in ter ests are ad vanced on bal ance when no one at all has the power to waive X's duty to j.
ing that power ad vances Y's own in ter ests on bal ance. By con trast, on (SHE), hav ing the power to waive X's duty qual i fies Y as a claim-right holder only if hav ing it ad vances Y's own in ter ests on bal ance (and that is what jus ti fies Y's power). Thus, some one who ex er cises a power of waiver in trust for some one elsefor exam ple, ei ther a sur ro gate decision-maker in clin i cal care or a par ent will thereby count as a claim-right holder on (SH), but not on (SHE). In pre fer ring (SHE), I assume that the sur ro gate or par ent is vested with a power of waiver in order to ad vance someone else's in ter ests on bal ance namely, those of the in com pe tent patient or mi nor. (SHE) has a fur ther ad van tage over (WT), which will agree with (SH) here.
Al though the change in con tent in tro duced by vari ant E is no doubt an im prove ment, it also mildly com pli cates the hy brid the ory's so lu tion to the third party ben e fi ciary prob lem. I shall ex plain the point sim ply in rela tion to the sta tus of the promisee (i. e., the sec ond party). In dis cuss ing (SH), I said we could as sume that the promisee has the power to waive the promisor's duty to ful fill the prom ise. Since the war rant for this assump tion is that it re flects a stan dard fea ture of prom is ing as or di narily un der stood, I shall con tinue to re gard it as an as sump tion we are en ti tled to make. As pre vi ously ex plained, the as sump tion suf fices, on (SH), to qual ify the promisee as a claim-right holder. How ever, it does not suf fice on (SHE). On (SHE), as we have just seen, the promisee (like any one else) qual i fies as a claim-right holder only if her power to waive the promisor's duty ad vances her own in ter ests on bal ance (and is jus ti fied on that basis).
The mild com pli ca tion, then, is that the ad e quacy of vari ant E's so lution to the third party ben e fi ciary prob lem de pends on the jus ti fi ca tion for em pow er ing the promisee to waive the promisor's duty; and this, in turn, will de pend upon our pre ferred the ory of prom is ing. To avoid having to en ter into that sub ject here, let me re-state the com pli ca tion as follows: Vari ant E con strains the the ory of prom is ing (or con tracts) to empower the promisee to waive the promisor's duty be cause the promisee's own in ter ests are ad vanced on bal ance by hav ing that power. I de scribe it as a mild com pli ca tion be cause it seems to me that any plau si ble the ory of prom is ing will plainly sat isfy this con straint. (CH) Sup pose X is duty-bound to j. Y has a claim-right against X that X j just in case:
Y's mea sure (and, if Y has a sur ro gate Z, Z's mea sure) of con trol over a duty of X's to j matches (by de sign) the mea sure of con trol that ad vances Y's in ter ests on bal ance.
I main tain that (CH) avoids Raz's prob lem of instrumentalizing the sta tus of claim-right holder. To see this, we should first no tice that (CH) treats the ques tion of whether a given duty cor re lates with an in di vidual's claim-right as strictly in de pend ent of the ques tion of what jus ti fies the given duty. 43 In par tic u lar, the ques tion of cor re la tion -and hence, as sign ment of the sta tus of right-holder-is in de pend ent of what jus tifies either the ex is tence or the weight of the given duty.
Having dis con nected these ques tions, (CH) then con fines the trade-offs af fect ing whether an in di vid ual is em pow ered to waive a given duty to the sphere of that same per son's in ter ests. The bal ance of in ter ests that set tles this ques tion is noth ing but a bal ance of the in di vid ual's own inter ests. Thus, the trade-offs that af fect an in di vid ual's sta tus as a claim-right holder, as some one to whom a par tic u lar duty is owed, do not have to be aligned with the in ter ests of third par ties. Nor need they be aligned with any other as pect of the larger trade-offs in her ent in the so cial cal cu lus. The per ils of instrumentalization are thereby avoided.
Of course, the na ture of a par tic u lar duty's jus ti fi ca tion will in ev i ta bly constrain whether a given in di vid ual can jus ti fi ably be em pow ered to waive the duty in ques tion. Thus, Y will be jus ti fi ably em pow ered to waive X's duty to j only if two fur ther con di tions are both sat is fied:
(i) the jus ti fi ca tion of X's duty to j is con sis tent with X's not j-ing; and claim-right against the promisor. No tice that the con straint says noth ing about how the promisor's duty has to be jus ti fied. In re la tion to the cen tral bur den of a the ory of promis ing, then, it is no con straint at all. 43 In deed, all the ver sions of my hy brid be gin with some such for mu la tion as Suppose X is duty-bound to j. This is meant to sig nal that the jus ti fi ca tion for the duty to ö is taken as given.
(ii) Y is a good jud ge of whet her con di tion (i) holds in any gi ven ca se.
(If we want Y to be uniquely em pow ered to waive X's duty, then we have to add:
(iii) Y is the only per son who is a good [enough] judge of whether con dition (i) holds in any given case). Now there are var i ous cases in which these fur ther con di tions may be sat is fied. The most fa mil iar case is where the de ci sive con sid er ation in the jus ti fi ca tion of X's duty to j sim ply is what ad vances Y's in ter ests on bal ance. Given the tra di tional lib eral dogma that an in di vid ual is the best judge of what ad vances his or her own in ter ests, Y will eas ily sat isfy con di tion (ii). In deed, Y will also sat isfy the ad di tional con di tion (iii), and hence be uniquely em pow ered to waive X's duty.
A sec ond case in which con di tions (i) and (ii) may be sat is fied is where third party in ter ests play a sig nif i cant role in the jus ti fi ca tion of X's duty to j (for ex am ple, in ex plain ing its great weight), but where these third party in ter ests are served pre cisely by ad vanc ing Y's in ter ests on bal ance. We might call this the con strained piggy-back sce nario because it de scribes a sub-set of Raz's piggy-back cases namely, those which also sat isfy con straints (i) and (ii). Strictly speak ing, this is sim ply a sub tle in stance of the pre vi ous case. 44 It there fore avoids con cerns about instrumentalizing the in di vid ual's sta tus as right-holder, since the de ci sive bal anc ing of in ter ests for vest ing Y with con trol over X´s duty re mains a bal anc ing of Y's own in ter ests. No tice that, here, the weight of X's duty to j de pends on the in ter ests of third par ties, but Y's sta tus as a claim-right holder ac cord ing to (CH) does not. Y's sta tus is in de pend ent of any align ment with the in ter ests of third par ties.
Fi nally, there may be cases where the jus ti fi ca tion of X's duty to ö has noth ing to do with Y's in ter ests, but where con di tions (i) and (ii) nev erthe less hold on ac count of Y's ex cel lence in judge ment. Y may be a superb judge of so cial util ity, for ex am ple. These cases may well raise con -A HYBRID THEORY OF CLAIM-RIGTHS 785 44 In this case, the de ci sive con sid er ations jus ti fy ing X's duty are the third party inter ests. Ex hypothesi, how ever, these de ci sive in ter ests are served pre cisely by serv ing the bal ance of Y's own in ter ests. That makes the bal ance of Y's in ter ests de ci sive for justi fy ing X's duty, which is why this is ac tu ally an in stance of the pre vi ous case. See also the dis cus sion be low of the art ist's right of in teg rity. cerns about instrumentalizing Y in some fash ion. How ever, we need not worry about them, since they are not cases in which (CH) vests Y with a cor re la tive claim-right.
It may be use ful to con sider an ex am ple of the con strained piggy-back sce nario. For tech ni cal rea sons, 45 the jour nal ist's case dis cussed ear lier is not re ally suit able to ex am ine in this con text. So let us con sider a structur ally sim i lar case in stead say, the claim-right of art ists to the in teg rity of their work. 46 The right of in teg rity cor re lates with a duty not to dis tort, dis mem ber, or mis rep re sent a work of art. It was vi o lated, for ex am ple, by the owner of a re frig er a tor, bought at a Paris char ity auc tion, on six pan els of which Ber nard Buf fet had painted a com po si tion. Al though Buf fet con sid ered the six pan els to be a sin gle work (and had signed only one of them), the owner of fered one of the pan els for sale at an other auction half a year later (buf fet sued to pre vent the sep a rate sale of the panel and won).
There are var i ous in ter ests served by the right of in teg rity. Clearly, these in clude the in ter ests of in di vid ual art ists, such as their in ter ests in com mu ni ca tion and in rep u ta tion. But the right of in teg rity also serves sig nif i cant third party in ter ests. In ad di tion to au di ence in ter ests, these third party in ter ests im por tantly in clude col lec tive so cial in ter ests for exam ple, the in ter est in pre serv ing a cul ture's ar tis tic her i tage. 47 To gether, 45 The jour nal ist's right to with hold the names of her sources is ac tu ally a cluster-right: a com bi na tion, that is, of a lib erty-right to with hold (or to dis close) these names and of a claim-right not to be re quired to dis close them. This is a fa mil iar ar range ment, in which the claim-right serves to pro tect the lib erty-right. How ever, it makes the re lation be tween a power to waive the cor re la tive duty (not to re quire dis clo sure) and the jour nal ist's pri mary in ter est here (i. e., the lib erty to with hold or dis close the rel e vant names) un nec es sar ily com pli cated for our pur poses. This is less of an is sue for Raz, for whom the spe cific no tion of a claim-right, as dis tinct from a lib erty-right, is not at the fore front of at ten tion. 46 For dis cus sion of this right, see (e. g.) Merryman, J. H., "The Re frig er a tor of Bernard Buf fet", Hastings Law Jour nal, 27, 1976 Jour nal, 27, , pp. 1023 Jour nal, 27, -1049 . The de tails of the case that fol low in the text ap pear on p. 1023. I owe the ex am ple and the ref er ence to Charles Beitz. 47 Com pare Merryman, op. cit., foot note 37, p. 1041: The ma chin ery of the state is avail able to pro tect "pri vate" rights in part be cause there is thought to be some gen eral ben e fit in do ing so. Thus the in ter ests of in di vid ual art ists and view ers are only a part of the story. Art is an as pect of our pres ent cul ture and our his tory; it helps tell us who we are and where we came from. To re vise, cen sor, or im prove the work of art is to fal sify a piece of the cul ture. the com mon good of an ar tis tic her i tage and the au di ence in ter ests ride piggy-back on the in di vid ual art ist's in ter est, since they are served precisely by pro tect ing that in di vid ual's (e. g., Buf fet's) own in ter est in com mu ni ca tion and rep u ta tion.
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Does the right of in teg rity il lus trate the con strained piggy-back scenario, more spe cif i cally? It de pends, in the first in stance, on whether the com mon good of an ar tis tic her i tage or the au di ence in ter ests are con sistent with in di vid ual art ists waiv ing the duty pro tect ing the in teg rity of their own works when they see fit. Sup pose the third party in ter ests were not con sis tent with this out come. In that case, we would have to give up the idea that art ists have a claim-right to the in teg rity of their work. For art ists should then be dis abled from waiv ing the rel e vant duty and their disability would not be de signed to ad vance the bal ance of their own interests. Rather, it would sim ply be re quired by the su pe rior weight of third party in ter ests in con sis tent with art ists hav ing the power to waive this duty. Hence, on (CH), in di vid ual art ists would have no claim-right.
But now sup pose, not im plau si bly, that the com mon good and the audi ence in ter ests are (at least, on bal ance) ac tu ally con sis tent with in di vidual art ists' be ing em pow ered to waive the duty not to dis tort, dis mem ber, or mis rep re sent their work. From the stand point of the so cial cal cu lus, there would no lon ger be an im ped i ment to art ists hav ing this power. How ever, while it may then be jus ti fi able to em power art ists to waive this duty, that does not suf fice to vest them with a claim-right: On (CH), it still mat ters whether this power of waiver ad vances their own in ter ests on bal ance. For sim plic ity, let us say that art ists have the power to waive the rel e vant duty and that (is be cause) it ad vances their in ter ests on bal ance.
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Then (CH) will as sign them a claim-right to the in teg rity of their work; and this claim-right will il lus trate the con strained piggy-back sce nario.
A HYBRID THEORY OF CLAIM-RIGTHS 787 48 To tighten the par al lel with the jour nal ist's claim-right, we can as sume, plau si bly, that these third party in ter ests have a greater weight in the so cial cal cu lus than the in terests of in di vid ual art ists. 49 In some ju ris dic tions (e. g., France), the right of in teg rity is ac tu ally par tially inalien able. The art ist lacks the power to waive the duty not to dis tort her work, but re tains the power to en force the duty (as Buf fet did) or not. This ar range ment re mains in the spirit of (CH), since it re flects the same con cern for the bal ance of the art ist's in ter ests (cfr. Merryman, op. cit., foot note 37, p. 1044). (We need not en quire here what mea sure of con trol over this duty best sat is fies that con cern).
The com pli ca tions here high light an im por tant point. When the sta tus of claim-right holder is not treated in stru men tally, piggy-back rid ing is a fairly pre car i ous en ter prise. To stick with the right of in teg rity, the third party in ter ests must be aligned with more than an art ist's in ter est in ac tually pro tect ing the in teg rity of her work. They must be aligned, more pre cisely, with the sub-align ment of the art ist's own bal ance of in ter ests on hav ing the choice to pro tect that in teg rity or not. The art ist's free dom of choice must serve both the bal ance of her own in ter ests and (the balance of) the com mon good and au di ence in ter ests. With out the first align ment, the art ist will not qual ify as the cor re la tive claim-right holder on (CH); and with out the sec ond align ment, it will not be jus ti fi able to em power her to waive a duty of such great weight. On the other hand, if this elab o rate align ment of in ter ests does hold, then the du ties pro tect ing the art ist's in ter est can have a greater weight than the art ist's in ter ests them selves jus tify, and this with out instrumentalizing her sta tus as the cor re la tive claim-right holder.
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